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Thomas M. Alexander*
Linguistic Pragmatism and Cultural Naturalism: Noncognitive Experience, 
Culture, and the Human Eros
Abstract: Contrary to some recent self-styled “linguistic pragmatists” who seek to 
dispense with the purportedly obsolete term “experience”. this essay attempts to 
show that pragmatism cannot cogently dispense with experience, understanding that 
term in its Deweyan sense as “culture” and not some sort of mentalistic perception 
or state. Focusing on Robert Brandom’s recent Perspectives on Pragmatism,  
I show how the very assumptions that Dewey meant to call into question with his 
“instrumentalist turn” in 1903 are enshrined in Brandom’s “new and improved” 
form of pragmatism. Judged in terms of its pragmatic consequences, Brandom’s 
linguistic pragmatism returns to the well trodden paths and problems of analytic 
philosophy and not the radical approach that Dewey’s “cultural naturalism” 
(Dewey’s name for his philosophy) offers. The fundamental issue is not, I contend, 
between types of pragmatism at all but between conceptions of human nature and 
what a human life is. John Stuart Mill once said of Bentham that, for an empiricist, 
he had really very little experience, especially of human nature. I am afraid that the 
same judgment here is passed on those wishing to dispense with experience and 
somehow retain pragmatism.
Introduction
John Stuart Mill remarks that although Bentham was an empiricist, his empiricism, 
at least in terms of knowledge of human nature, was that “of one who has had little 
experience”. I am afraid that may well relect the judgment of this essay regarding 
“linguistic pragmatism” insofar as it wishes to dispense with the idea of experience 
in opposition to the more classically grounded pragmatists, like myself, who afirm 
that experience is central and vitally indispensable to the very thought of pragmatism. 
Mill adds to his comment the observation that Bentham’s simplistic, almost childlike, 
conception of human nature was combined with a remarkable gift for drawing 
inferences. The result was that, however sharp his reasoning, “his general conception 
of human nature and life furnished him with an unusually slender stock of premises”. 
This, in Mill’s eyes, was fatal: “The irst question in regard to any man of speculation 
is What is his theory of human life?” 1. I ind his comment pertinent and I think this – 
the theory of human life – really should be the topic of our debate.
Linguistic pragmatism, represented here by Robert Brandom’s recent Perspectives 
on Pragmatism (PP hereafter), conines its vision of human existence to theories 
of linguistic meaning, where language is thought of as largely concerned with 
epistemological issues, such as representationalism vs. functionalism. This is done to 
update pragmatism and make it socially acceptable to analytically trained philosophers. 
In doing so it seems unaware of a larger and richer semiotic approach to meaning or 
a larger and richer view of experience beyond the circumscribed issue of knowledge. 
In fact, it really is a continuation of the narrow commitments of recent Anglophone 
philosophy rather than some new development within “pragmatism” per  se. A label 
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1. Mill (1961: 23-25).
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has been appropriated, not a philosophy – one of the reasons it is a bad idea to 
approach philosophy in terms of its “isms”2. Aside from the narrow focus, linguistic 
pragmatism displays a poor understanding of the classical experiential pragmatism it 
believes to have surpassed: it is, at best, thinly informed, selective in its readings, and 
often inaccurate or just plain wrong in its claims about the classical pragmatists and 
the pragmatist tradition3. This criticism is perhaps more a matter of scholarship than 
philosophy (though one wonders about any self-professed empiricism that treats its 
data so arbitrarily). But it certainly weakens any claim that linguistic pragmatism is 
a genuine development of the pragmatist outlook rather than a misleading borrowing 
of a now-fashionable term. And that alone calls into doubt the cogency of the call to 
eliminate “experience” from the basic pragmatist vocabulary.
In this essay I will touch on certain key themes of the classical pragmatist idea 
of experience that I believe are fundamental to the very idea of “pragmatism” and 
which cannot be lost without changing the meaning of what pragmatism is. Insofar 
as John Dewey developed the most robust understanding of experience, I will use 
his thought to represent what “experiential pragmatism” embraces and “linguistic 
pragmatism” does not. This will call for some examination of Dewey’s texts, but I do 
not believe that the exegesis will be misplaced, given, as I said, the rather limited way 
his thought has been understood, when it has been understood at all, by the linguistic 
pragmatists. In fact, upon inspection, linguistic pragmatism seems to endorse positions 
similar to those explicitly criticized by Dewey in the course of articulating both his 
instrumentalism and his general theory of experience. Thus I believe the debate 
between linguistic and experiential pragmatism relects a fundamental philosophical 
conlict – a conlict about the purpose of philosophy and its conception of human 
existence – and not a petty “in-house” controversy between “new-fangled” and “old-
fashioned” versions of pragmatism. 
I will discuss four points about Dewey’s concept of experience that are at odds 
with linguistic pragmatism. They are listed below with a brief synopsis:
The Irreducibility of the Noncognitive. The noncognitive dimension of experience 
is essential for pragmatic inquiry; “pragmatism” or instrumentalism as a theory of 
inquiry does not make sense without it. This limits the extent of cognition and prevents 
seeing the context or background in terms of incipiently articulated propositionally 
structured beliefs or desires. Rather, this broader ield is better described as “aesthetic” 
than as one of even implicit cognitive content. Philosophy should aim at what Dewey 
(following Keats) calls “half-knowledge” instead of some pancognitivist program4. 
2. “Pragmatism” itself is a poor term to refer to the philosophies of C. S.  Peirce, William James, John 
Dewey, and George Herbert Mead. At best it captures only a portion of their positions but misses 
Peirce’s metaphysics and semeiotic and James’s radical empiricism. Dewey’s preferred term for his 
philosophy as a whole (not just his instrumentalism) was “cultural naturalism”.
3. Brandom, for example, tells us that: James is a Kantian working through Hegel (PP: 3-4); Peirce, 
James and Dewey are “materialists” (42); and Dewey’s theory of truth is the satisfaction of subjective 
desire (51-52, 72-77). Brandom’s reliance on Louis Menand’s lawed, quirky The Metaphysical Club 
is another indication of the book’s weak historical grounding (43-45). 
4. See Dewey’s important conclusion to Chapter 2, “The Live Creature and Ethereal Things”, in Art as 
Experience (LW 10: 39-41). Dewey works will be cited in the standard format of the critical ed. publish. 
by Southern Illinois University Press: EW (Early Works), MW (Middle Works), and LW (Later Works). 
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Not only does this restrict the idea that all experience is inherently cognitive, it 
prevents any possibility of a “rationalistic” or “Hegelian” conception of pragmatism. 
Linguistic pragmatism misses the centrality of the “had” or “undergone” aspect 
of experience, an integral but ineffable dimension of our existential inhabitation 
of nature, a “generic trait”, in Dewey’s terms. This blindness leads to a neglect of 
understanding what Dewey means by “situation” and its pervasive qualitative horizon 
which is a condition of conscious rational thinking and pragmatic inquiry. In short, 
linguistic pragmatism loses the vast noncognitive dimension of human experience, 
the aesthetics of existence. 
Experience is Culture. In spite of a lifetime explaining what he meant by 
“experience”, Dewey is still read as somehow standing in the British empiricist 
tradition’s assimilation of experience to “perception” and its derivatives (such as 
sense data, mental states, propositional content, etc.), i.e., something occurring in (or 
by means of) some entity called a “mind”5. “Experience” in Dewey’s sense is not 
“perception” but adaptive existence, which in human existence takes on the form 
of culture. Even Brandom, who treats Dewey’s view of experience in terms of the 
organism-environment relation as a mechanistic feedback loop (PP: 39-40), wants to 
focus on “the priority of the propositional” (PP: 3, 8-9). The meaning of “experience” 
for Dewey is “culture”, not “perception” or something explicated in propositional 
units; it is primarily social and not a feature of a “mind” (as philosophy of mind likes 
to think of it). In fact, for Dewey, “mind” is another way of referring to “culture”. 
“Mind” is what is passed on from one generation to the next and is the formative 
context within which individuals develop and by which they become communicative 
beings. It is the process of cultural communication, exempliied in education.
Language is Communication. Culture is the “Tool of Tools”: “Language” for 
Dewey is just this process of communication. The key to understanding it is not 
to focus initially on propositions but on the fact that it calls for listeners as well as 
speakers and that both imaginatively see themselves from the standpoints of the 
others. The phenomenon of communication involves a dramatic form of imagination 
(unsuspected, as far as I can tell, by Wittgenstein) in which we take on the role of 
the other to determine the possible meaning of a symbol we may use. Language is 
this world of mutual symbolic participation, of shared experience. It is this view that 
lies behind Dewey’s description of language as “the tool of tools”. In other words, 
language is “culture” in the anthropological sense of the word, a shared symbolic life. 
Language is less a formal syntactic-semantic system than it is an interactive process 
of symbolic communication involving mutual imaginative copresence. “Language” 
can thereby include all modes of symbolic communication and so it, too, is another 
way of saying “culture”. When Dewey describes language as “the tool of tools”, he 
is not thinking of language as some “meta-instrument” (PP: 28) or some external 
5. This desire to force the pragmatists into the traditional history of modern empiricism is relected also 
when Robert Brandom interprets the pragmatists as constituting a “Second Enlightenment”, pushing 
forward the light of reason in all dark corners and promoting a panscientistic agenda (PP: 35-36, 40-
43). To support this untenable claim, Brandom makes another, that Romanticism had no effect on the 
major pragmatists. This is simply untrue, especially of Dewey. See Goodman 1990.
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piece of technology consciously created with a speciic purpose. What he is saying is 
that all speciic symbolic or tool-using actions depend on culture: i.e., technologies 
depend upon culture. Language as culture is what makes it the “tool of tools”; it is 
the condition of technologies. Insofar as linguistic pragmatism has not even raised 
its eyes to address a deeply cultural conception of experience and language, I do not 
see how its highly reined and strictly limited concerns about beliefs and propositions 
begin to approach a Deweyan conception of language as culture. 
Linguistic Pragmatism vs. Cultural Naturalism. Thus I believe that the future of 
“pragmatism” lies in relocating it within “cultural naturalism” (the correct name of 
Dewey’s philosophy) or what I call “ecological humanism”. It lies in focusing on the 
idea of culture in the anthropological sense and not returning to “linguistic philosophy” 
as usual. It asks for a richer sense of human existence than to portray us as robotic 
knowing machines. The new Anglophone pragmatism is, I believe, a regression to the 
old habits of analytic philosophy and not any sort of creative growth of the classical 
pragmatic position. If we look at the pragmatic consequences of linguistic pragmatism, 
it means doing the same thing analytic philosophy has been doing for decades: talking 
about propositions and focusing on epistemology and philosophy of mind. Politically, 
however, it operates as an attempt to commandeer the resurgent interest in pragmatism 
and draw it back into the familiar hegemonic Anglophone conception of philosophy. 
Thus I not only defend retaining the use of the term “experience” (as “culture”) but 
believe that it must be genuinely developed. 
There is a lot of exposition of Dewey in what follows, but that is because the term 
“experience” is his more than anyone’s among the pragmatists. It is Dewey who is 
accused by Brandom as well as by Cheryl Misak as being the “mistake”, the “wrong 
turn”, or “dead end” in their versions of the history of the movement6. Thus there is 
more than some point to spending time on Dewey. But I do not believe that is where 
we should stay – just begin. It is high time we started thinking about “philosophy 
of culture” rather than “philosophy of mind” and turned toward anthropology and 
semiotics rather than physics, neurology, or information theory. One could even speak 
of reviving the idea of a philosophy of symbolic forms. To that end I have made 
some developments elsewhere that I will briely mention at the end of this essay more 
by way of illustration than substantive exposition of a new direction for developing 
pragmatism as an “ecological humanism” or “cultural naturalism”. 
The Rebirth of Pragmatism 
It is dificult to realize that Richard Rorty’s Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature 
made its appearance some thirty-ive years ago. For someone of my generation, 
Rorty had been one of the younger standard bearers of “the linguistic turn”7. As a 
6. See (PP: 48 ff.), and Misak 2013.
7. Rorty’s anthology, The Linguistic Turn (1967) was de rigueur and the “Introduction” – as we read 
it then – seemed to look forward to an indeinite future of linguistic philosophy. In retrospect, it seems 
full of the irony, doubts, and sense of faddish contingency that became explicit in Rorty’s thought later 
on. Rorty’s subsequent introductions to the famous collection make this clear.
tHoMas M. aLexanDer Linguistic pragMatisM anD cuLturaL naturaLisM
ISSN: 2036-4091               2014, VI, 2
68
young philosopher and scholar working in the American tradition, Rorty’s sudden 
appropriation of Dewey (and Heidegger) felt to me like the “Year of Jubilee” when 
all slaves would be set free. For in those days you couldn’t mention Dewey or James 
in polite philosophical company, and Peirce was barely tolerated (at least, he was a 
logician!). As for Heidegger, how often did I hear “Heidegger is not a philosopher”8? 
The American Philosophical Association was not just dominated by analytic philo-
sophy but had become a self-perpetuating analytic hegemony. This was not due to 
some accidental outcome but was a conscious ideological statement of what constituted 
“real philosophy”. Philosophers of other persuasions “need not apply”9. Its control of 
the main organ of the profession meant replicating its type of philosophy throughout 
departments in the United States indeinitely. Thus arose the various “satellite” 
organizations like The Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy and the 
historical recovery of the work of Dewey, James and Peirce through critical editions 
of their works10. We tried to create an atmosphere in which philosophy could be done 
in the spirit of a community of inquiry and not as a confrontational jousting match. 
Suddenly, Rorty had not only veritably shouted out the names of Heidegger and 
Dewey, mentioning them in the same breath as that of the sainted Wittgenstein, but he 
called the whole analytic project and the march of scientiic truth into question, raising 
the Specter of Relativism.
For me and those like me, it was a double-edged experience. Yes, it felt as if Rorty 
had opened all the windows of a hot, stuffy school on a bright early spring day, letting 
in smells of wet earth and new life mingled with a clean, cold wind from distant snows 
on mountains. But his breezy, slap-dash “scholarship” and the portrait of Dewey as 
a relativist were appalling. As the Rorty phenomenon burgeoned, it came to deine 
the debate on what was and was not “pragmatism”11. For better or worse, Rorty had 
indeed opened up the “conversation” and “pragmatism” was no longer just a term 
for what fuzzy-minded American thinkers did in the olden days before the discovery 
of logical ire and Vienna Circle positivists, leeing Hitler, brought its secret to 
America.
Now, it seems, there is a wealth of “pragmatists”. Not only is there “pragmatism” but 
there are many subvarieties of “-isms” of pragmatism. Robert Brandom alone offers a 
8. Bertrand Russell dismisses him with one quip in his historical picture book, Wisdom of the West 
(1964).
9. See Bruce Wilshire’s incisive discussion of this issue in Fashionable Nihilism: A Critique of 
Analytic Philosophy (2002); see in particular (“The Pluralist Rebellion in the American Philosophical 
Association”, Chapter 3: 51 ff.).
10. Aside from the beginnings of the critical editions of the works of Dewey, then James, then Peirce, 
Santayana, and, now, Royce, there were three highly important anthologies with weighty and insightful 
introductions by John McDermott: The Writings of William James (1967) The Philosophy of John 
Dewey (1973), and Josiah Royce: Basic Writings (1969). Mention should also be made of H.S. Thayer’s 
monumental Meaning and Action: A Critical History of Pragmatism (1981) and Elizabeth Flower’s 
and Murray Murphy’s A History of American Philosophy (1977).
11. Why did Rorty even embrace this term? He had no concern with methods, inquiries, consequences. 
He found that things he said “sounded like” things Dewey said. But, with the appearance of 
Consequences of Pragmatism (1982), it was clear that the “consequences” were for determining 
conversational topics.
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dizzying assortment, ranging from “fundamentalist pragmatism” to “methodological 
pragmatism” to “instrumentalist pragmatism” to “semantic pragmatism” to “linguistic 
pragmatism” to “normative pragmatism”. While the renewed interest is welcome and 
healthy, I ind that a great deal has been sacriiced and what I hope to offer here, 
as summarized above, is a series of points that serve to divide “experientialist” 
pragmatists from the “linguistic” pragmatists. I think these points touch on matters so 
integral to what pragmatism – at least Deweyan pragmatism – is all about that I wonder 
if the use of “pragmatism” should be dropped by all for the sake of clarity. In PP, 
Brandom has a generous list of “pluses” that classical pragmatism offers, but he goes 
on to say “what one misses most in the pragmatists – at any rate separates them from 
us – is that they do not share the distinctively twentieth-century philosophical concern 
with language, and with the discontinuituies with nature [sic!] that it establishes and 
enforces” (PP: 55)12. Brandom wishes to retain “putting language at the center of 
philosophical concerns” and wants “understanding philosophical problems” to be 
in terms of “the language one uses in formulating them”. Speciically, “lingualism” 
should be “a commitment to understanding conceptual capacities (discursiveness in 
general) in terms of linguistic capacities” (PP: 22). Philosophy becomes philosophy 
of language before it is philosophy of anything else.
I don’t think the analytic pragmatists knew what they were getting into when 
they turned to pragmatism and, once they actually realize it, they will be appalled. 
“Isms” are dangerous things, anyway. They may sound like highly technical terms, 
but they are broad, impressionistic gestures at best and induce one to attack straw 
men. I think it is especially unfortunate that the term “pragmatism” has come to 
characterize “American philosophy” as a whole, especially for foreign students. 
The American philosophical tradition has many mansions, vibrant and rich ones 
besides pragmatism. Also, as noted above, to characterize Peirce, James and Dewey 
simply as “pragmatists” narrows the sense of their overall philosophical positions; 
it’s rather like describing Aristotle as a “logicist”. Does “pragmatism” begin to hint 
at Peirce’s vast architectonic philosophy or his semiotic evolutionary cosmology? It 
by-passes James’s “radical empiricism”, which (he claimed) stood or fell apart from 
his “pragmatism”, as well as his psychology and religious philosophy. And we have 
this from John Dewey in his eighties in a letter to Corliss Lamont, “I have come to 
think of my own position as cultural or humanistic Naturalism. Naturalism, properly 
interpreted, seems to me a more adequate term than Humanism. Of course I have 
always limited my use of ‘instrumentalism’ to my theory of thinking and knowledge; 
the word ‘pragmatism’ I have used very little, and then with reserves”13.
So, here, it is not really helpful to characterize “the pragmatists” by “pragmatism” 
either. But, if we must speak in the generalities of “isms” here ,“pragmatism” it must be.
12. How could a naturalist profess to ind “discontinuities with nature”? Dewey’s own approach was 
to take nature as it came and if at some times and places it has language events, then that tells us 
something about nature. “Continuity” does not mean reduction but growth. It is evolutionary.
13. Dewey to Corliss Lamont, Sept. 6, 1940, cited in Lamont (1961: 26).
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“The Intellectualist Fallacy” and a Noncognitive Approach to “Experience”
One of the major “tacit presuppositions” (to use Whitehead’s expression) that 
most of Anglophone philosophy inherited from the modern period was the idea that 
human beings were fundamentally knowers and therefore that the main problem of 
philosophy was the problem of knowledge. We were also subjects, speciically minds, 
set over against a world. Whatever else was happening to a subject (or mind), the 
subject was also “knowing”. One simply wasn’t in pain; one also knew one was in 
pain. The subject was a “knowing mind” and the question was how it knew, whether 
by ideas, impressions, sense data and a priori rules, mental states, or propositional 
attitudes, and so on. Brandom, for example, while recognizing that not all beliefs 
are explicit, nevertheless thinks of them as encapsulating “content” in terms of the 
role they play in the whole of all other beliefs; the same is true of desires (PP: 19-
20). Experience is about judging, the application of concepts or rules to which one 
is then committed rationally (PP: 2-3). This cannot lead to an ininite regress (rules 
for applying rules) but is grounded on beliefs as dispositions to act (PP: 13-14). For 
Brandom, this is “fundamental pragmatism”: knowing that is based on knowing how 
(PP: 9). In spite of the “pragmatic” turn in placing emphasis on belief as action, it still 
has tacit propositional content that can be linguistically explicated. I think this is still 
a version of the assumption that all experience is about knowing14. All phenomena of 
human existence, or at least human mentality, whatever else they may be, are to be 
regarded in terms of their status as knowledge, as verbal knowledge. It is of utmost 
importance to realize that Dewey rejected this thesis from the very incipience of what 
became his mature position. This was the basis of his instrumentalism. 
Although there are anticipations of Dewey’s theory of inquiry in his writings 
from the mid 1890s on, the instrumental theory of knowing as inquiry is dramatically 
unveiled in the essays he contributed to his department’s collective publication, 
Studies in Logical Theory (1903)15. Dewey’s four essays carefully work out the view 
of thought as arising within life experience (which is concerned with other things than 
knowing) and terminating in it. Knowing is a reconstructive phase of experience; it is 
something actually done (not some behind the scenes mental operation or a general 
“condition for the possibility of knowledge”). Nor is it the whole affair; it is just 
an intermediary process. The implications of this account of inquiry are developed 
in “The Postulate of Immediate Empiricism” (1905), published just after Dewey’s 
move to Columbia. It was not until he wrote the extended “Introduction” to Essays 
in Experimental Logic (1916) that he achieved the irst fully developed statement his 
mature theory of experience16.
14. In fairness, Brandom protests against representationalism and the idea of content at the prepersonal 
level (PP: 12-13). But “each new episode of experience” is for him is a “perceptual judgment” that 
must be integrated into an evolving rational whole of commitments (PP: 2).
15. The essays are: “The Relationship of Thought and Its Subject-Matter”, “Antecedents and Stimuli 
of Thinking”, “Data and Meanings”, and “The Objects of Thought”; they were reprinted in Essays in 
Experimental Logic (1916) and can be found in (MW 2: 296-367).
16. This introduction can be found in (MW 10: 320-65).
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The story of this development cannot be told here, obviously, but the key insight is 
that not all experience is experience-as-known and that knowing experience arises and 
terminates within experience that is not knowing. To afirm that all experiences are 
also knowing experiences is to commit what Dewey came to call “the Intellectualist 
Fallacy”17. Initially Dewey saw this point as the basis of his disagreement with 
absolute idealism, and so the essays in Studies in Logical Theory are directed against 
the now forgotten igure of Hermann Lötze. But he soon came to see it as the basis 
of his disagreement with the realists, including Bertrand Russell, and ultimately 
with most of the history of western philosophy. The explicit claim to equate what 
truly, really is with what is known goes back to Parmenides: “For it is the same: to 
know and to be”18. While the medieval period may have made the reality of God 
transcend our knowing, God knew the world and the human intellect approximated 
His knowledge as best it could. The moderns, too, made the known the criterion of 
being, with less modesty than the medievals. Homo cogitat, said Spinoza, which for 
him meant man could grasp the ininite and eternal essence of God or Nature. The 
post-Kantian idealists made knowing – especially as self-knowing – the constitution 
of reality, of Spirit’s unfolding of its inner necessity. The naturalist version of this is 
that nature is whatever scientiic knowing is. For example, Huw Price characterizes 
“popular naturalism” as “the view that in some important sense, all there is is the 
world studied by science”19. Brandom unveils his scientia mensura: “science is 
the measure of all things – of those that are that they are, of those that are not, that 
they are not” and sees this as a central commitment of the pragmatists “and their 
Enlightenment ancestors” (PP: 38-39). Quite the contrary: Dewey sees the equation of 
reality with the known as misguided and fruitless20. (And so his version of naturalism, 
cultural naturalism, must not be confused with this thesis.) His recently discovered 
uncompleted opus, written in his eighties, is a long diagnosis of the consequences of 
this assumption and the unfortunate “epistemology industry” that has lourished in its 
wake21. So: it is important to be clear on this point because it diverges so much from 
the presuppositions of most Anglophone philosophers, including those who have read 
enough Dewey to think they understand him. They miss it by a mile22. 
Why did Dewey come to this conclusion? Again, the answer for this is found 
in his essays for Studies in Logical Theory. Recall the context: Dewey had been an 
17. See Experience and Nature (LW 1: 28) and The Quest for Certainty (LW 4: 232). See also “Beliefs 
and Existences” (MW 3:83-100), “The Intellectualist Criterion of Truth” (MW 4: 50-75) and “Brief 
Studies in Realism” (MW 6:103-22).
18. DK B3; my translation.
19. Price (2013: 4-5).
20. Neither James nor Peirce would accept this either. James’s The Will to Believe and Essays in Radical 
Empiricism cannot in any way be said to submit to the thesis. Peirce may have said reality (the general 
universe of Thirdness or laws) would be discerned by inquiry in the long run, but this did not apply to 
existence (the domain of Secondness) or to those pure qualitative possibilities of the domain of Firstness.
21. See John Dewey, Modern Philosophy and Unmodern Philosophy (2012). The phrase “epistemology 
industry” is most famously found in “The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy” (MW 10: 23) but can 
be found as early as 1897 (EW 5:29).
22. As one analytic colleague, sitting in on my Dewey seminar, said when this point was made, “Oh, 
so that’s what is wrong with him!”
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articulate spokesman for absolute idealism since his early essays of the mid-1880s and 
Psychology of 1887. But during his tenure as chair of the Department of Philosophy, 
Pedagogy and Psychology (1893-1903) at the University of Chicago, his focus was on 
the nature of education – on the actual process of learning and not the “justiication” 
of knowledge assumed to be true. Moreover he had been highly inluenced by 
William James’s The Principles of Psychology, which he encountered in the year 
of its publication, 1890. He was particularly impressed by James’s functionalistic 
view of mind as a selective “ighter for ends” and his view of experience as 
already coming whole, something in need of analysis and clariication, rather than 
the traditional empiricist view of experience constituted by swarms of atomically 
discrete impressions in need of some active power of mind to weld them together into 
a world23. James had removed at a blow the spectator theory of consciousness and the 
need for any a priori synthetic power as a condition for experience. Dewey had begun 
to understand thinking – thinking not thought – as a process in the lifeworld and not 
its underpinning. Moreover, James had described what he called “The Psychologist’s 
Fallacy”: the psychologist, standing “outside the mental state that he speaks of”, 
as James puts it, assumes that the state “knows” its object as he does. In other words, 
what for the psychologist is the outcome of cognitive analysis is assumed to be the 
original condition of the experience: hence it “really” was a knowing experience all 
along24. Dewey generalized this criticism: philosophers, treating everything from 
the standpoint of analytical, relective experience, i.e., as known, assume that all 
experience originally is as it is known in inquiry; results attained by selection and 
analysis are substituted for the complex, full-bodied and richly ambiguous experience. 
It is not that the object as known is made up out of thin air; it is not. But it is a selective 
reinement of experience, selecting some features and disregarding others25.
The irst of the four essays Dewey contributed to Studies in Logical Theory, 
“The Relationship of Thought and Its Subject-Matter”, begins by noting that “no one 
doubts” that relective thought is secondary, that is “it comes after something and out 
of something, and for the sake of something” (MW 2: 298). Dewey is referring here 
to “relecting” as a part of ordinary life: trying to negotiate a new town, remembering 
where a lost item might be, wondering how to repair a broken friendship. Dewey is 
not thinking of a “mind” that is cogitating, much less generating propositions, behind 
the scenes, so to speak. Dewey begins with the concrete phenomenon of inquiry. To 
do so, however, plunges one into “the very heart of the logical problem; the relation 
of thought to its empirical antecedents and to its consequent, truth, and the relation 
of truth to reality” (MW 2: 298). From the commonsense, practical attitude, there is 
no such dificulty. “The antecedents of thought are our universe of life and love; of 
appreciation and struggle” (MW 2: 298). In these situations the function of thinking 
is to mediate, which, if successful (and if it really resolves the problem and doesn’t 
23. See James 1890 I: 141, and Chapter IX.
24. James (1890, vol. I.: 196 ff.).
25. This explains why Dewey’s view of knowledge does not say (as Russell accused him of saying) that 
we cannot really know the world; the world prior to being known is know-able in certain respects, but 
it is “-able” in a variety of other ways as well. Its existence is not at issue; the “external world” does 
not have to be “proved” because it is not “external” to begin with.
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just satisfy subjective desire), marks the cessation of the process for the while. There 
is a “rhythm of direct practice and derived theory” (MW 2: 299). The primary phase 
is “prediscursive” as the inal phase is postdiscursive. The “discursive phase”, which 
is a transformational process and not something simply propositional, comes in 
between. Thus, one problem with linguistic pragmatism is that it attempts to make an 
intermediary function the whole picture; it was the point of Dewey’s revolution to put 
the role of inquiry – as process – in its place26. 
Dewey contrasts this “organic” view of thinking as part of the life-process with 
epistemology, which tries to deal with “thought at large” and its relation to “reality at 
large” (MW 2: 303). Dewey sees continuity between the thinking of “the plain man” 
(as he likes to say) and scientiic inquiry; “The fundamental assumption is continuity” 
(MW 2: 305-06)27. The latter ends in a cul-de-sac, “a problem which can be discussed 
only in terms of itself” (MW 2: 308). The former takes seriously the idea of a “natural 
history” of thinking and inquiry, a “logic of experience”, with the various distinctions 
of logic formed in the context of inquiry as “organs of adjustment”; the latter rejects 
any temporal or genetic issues as having bearing on its formal conception of logic and 
knowledge (MW 2: 309, 313, 304). 
In the second essay for Studies, “The Antecedents and Stimuli of Thinking”, 
Dewey gives an early description of what becomes a central term in his thought: 
“situation”. This is also relevant for grasping the basis of his noncognitivism. Not only 
is our involvement with the world prior to a speciic inquiry, it is also an involvement 
that is not grounded on a basic subject-object distinction at the outset. A situation is 
a condition for inquiry because it itself is not inquired into at the time. Aspects or 
features of it may come up for inquiry; aspects or features of it may be the settled 
outcomes of prior inquiries. But none of this makes it intrinsically cognitive. The 
fact that it is analyzable does not mean it is already analyzed (MW 2: 326 ff.). It is 
the situation as a whole that is the condition and stimulus to thinking (MW 2: 328). 
The situation, in other words, is not an aggregate but a dynamic continuity28. “All 
distinctions discovered within thinking”, says Dewey, “come within the thought-
situation as growing out of a characteristic antecedent typical formulation of 
experience” and aim at “the restoration of a deliberately integrated experience from 
the inherent conlict into which it has fallen” (MW 2:336). This applies to the subject-
object distinction as well.
Dewey expands James’s view of selectivity in the stream of thought to refer to 
the situation of inquiry: certain features are selected as important and having bearing. 
26. Brandom acknowledges a prediscursive background, our dispositiional beliefs, but treats them 
merely as the predecessors of verbally explicit articulations. See (PP: 12-13).
27. This is eloquently put forth many years later in Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, Chapter 4, “Common 
Sense and Scientiic Inquiry”.
28. Thus, although Brandom wishes to characterize his “fundamental pragmatism” by stressing the 
need for an “implicit background of not explicitly conceptual abilities” made up of “potential beliefs” 
that are the condition of explicit intentions and beliefs with content, he still regards this background as 
constituted by speciic “know-how” abilities that can be expressed linguistically. He is interested in this 
background only in terms of cognition, of knowing that as a result of knowing how. This conception of 
the background is very far from what Dewey calls “the situation”. See (PP: 65-67).
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As Dewey will say later, “data” being selected out are really “takens” rather than 
“givens”29. They are given “to further thought” (MW 2: 343). But there are no “ready-
made antecedents”. Over against these selected features, “There is always something 
unquestioned in any problematic situation at any state of its process” (MW 2: 339). 
The process also involves contrasting what are taken as data from the operations and 
inferences that “thought” makes. The two are functionally distinguished, like building 
material and building tools (MW 2: 364). The test of thought is achieving a resolved 
situation, “the unity of the experience actually effected. The test of the validity of 
thought is beyond thought” (MW 2: 367). And so by giving a functional analysis of 
the process of inquiry, Dewey avoids transposing the objects and their meanings that 
are selectively abstracted from the more complete situation back into the original 
situation as they have become determinate in the process of knowing. This is Dewey’s 
version of James’s Psychologist’s Fallacy. The pre-known world is a matrix out of 
which any variety of selections can be made. To pronounce some particular selection 
as what it “really” is then results in denying full reality to the others so that, at best, 
they become “appearances”.
By 1905, Dewey was ready to draw a metaphysical conclusion from his new model 
of inquiry. As I have discussed elsewhere, “The Postulate of Immediate Empiricism” 
was a highly controversial essay which even today is not well understood30. The essay 
appeared amid the “realist revival” as well as in the wake of James’s irst articles on 
radical empiricism. In a sense, Dewey’s essay is a response to both. He accepts James’s 
view of experience as a living whole from which aspects and concepts are abstracted 
and he extends this to a new view of reality that rejects the radical separation of the 
subject, and all that comes with it, from the world. In Dewey’s later language, when one 
is in doubt, “doubt” is not a subjective state but a feature of “the situation”. Aligning 
himself with that “movement” called “radical empiricism, pragmatism, humanism, 
functionalism”, Dewey adds his own newly-christened “immediate empiricism”. 
“Immediate empiricism postulates that things – anything, everything, in the ordinary or 
non-technical use of the term ‘thing’ – are what they are experienced as” (MW 3: 158). 
To “describe a thing truly” one must “tell what it is experienced as being”. To interpret 
“experienced as” into “known as” is the problem. “This is the root paralogism of all 
idealisms, whether subjective or objective, psychological or epistemological” and “if 
not the root of all philosophic evil, at least one of its main roots” (MW 3: 159-60).
If one retains a subject-object dichotomy underlying this process beforehand, then 
this sounds like pure subjective relativism, for “experience” will be understood as 
“in a subject” or “in the mind”. But what Dewey intends is to stress all the ways in 
which some “thing” can be involved in our interactions (“experience”) apart from 
one dominating concern like knowing. A horse may be a means of transportation, a 
beloved companion, a beautiful creature, and so on. None of these are instances of 
knowing. Any of these relations may become occasions for inquiry insofar as they 
become problematic: As a parent, is the horse too temperamental and unsafe for my 
29. The Quest for Certainty (LW 4: 142-43); the chapter is a mature summation of the thesis of the 
essays for Studies in Logical Theory.
30. See my “The Aesthetics of Reality”, in The Human Eros (2013).
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child to ride? As a caring owner, is the responsible thing to keep a sick horse alive 
or have it put down? As an artist, did my painting do justice to its beauty? All these 
are situations in which there is indeterminacy and doubt; they involve operations of 
inquiry to be resolved. Dewey’s point is that all these ways of being-in-relation-to-
the-horse, including the mode of inquiry or knowing, are real. But one “real” is not 
privileged over the others. Thus “reality” takes on a plurivocity with a variety of 
“as-structures”; these cannot all be reduced to the univocity of “as-known”. Nor does 
this mean that one sort of noncognitive interaction, say one of aesthetic appreciation, 
cannot turn into a situation in which inquiry, and so, possibly, knowledge, emerge. 
A veterinarian enjoying riding a horse may notice something that might indicate a 
disease and begin to examine the animal to determine the result. The outcome of 
diagnosis would be an instance of knowing because it is the result of inquiries initiated 
by a tensive or problematic aspect of a situation. But, also, knowing situations can 
transform into aesthetic ones or other sorts of noncognitive interactions. The main 
idea is that the matrix of inquiry, the lifeworld, is largely noncognitive.
In Experience and Nature, Dewey expands this idea of the noncognitive dimension 
of experience to characterize the qualitatively immediate and ineffable aspect of 
existence as existence. He describes certain “generic traits” of nature, the primary ones 
being “doing” and “undergoing”. Undergoing is what Dewey also calls “having”, the 
qualitative, determinate immediacy of existence as the outcome of a history of events31. 
It is the brute thatness of any experience32. Dewey observes that “in every event there is 
something obdurate, self-suficient, wholly immediate, neither a relation nor an element 
in a relational whole, but terminal and exclusive” (LW 1: 74). There is this aspect to any 
experience, to any moment of interaction. And Dewey insists that it is ineffable: 
Immediacy of existence is ineffable. But there is nothing mystical about such ineffability; 
it expresses the fact that of direct existence it is futile to say anything to oneself and 
impossible to say anything to another. Discourse can but intimate connections which 
if followed out may lead one to have an [experience]. Things in their immediacy are 
unknown and unknowable...because knowledge has no concern with them. (LW 1: 74)33
Any system, he adds, materialistic or idealistic, that renders reality as a pure system 
of relations has committed the Intellectualist Fallacy; it has taken knowing, which is 
concerned with relations, as the key to all existence. Thus, for Dewey, all experience 
31. See Experience and Nature (LW 1, Chapter 3). There is a reason Dewey presents this generic 
trait of qualitative immediacy before that of relation, as revealed in doing, and knowing, the theme 
of  Chapter 4. In “The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy” Dewey says, “Experience is primarily a 
process of undergoing: a process of standing something; of suffering and passion, of affection, in the 
literal sense of these words” (MW 10: 8). Brandom wholly neglects this aspect of experience for his 
emphasis on doing: “Experience is work: the application of force through distance. It is something done 
rather than something that merely happens” (PP: 7).
32. Remember to read “experience” mainly as existence, the way the world is as we are in it, and not 
perception.
33. The passage has “have an existence” rather than “have an experience”; I believe this is a mistake 
that was not caught. Dewey constantly speaks of “having an experience” and, to my knowledge, never 
anywhere else of “having an existence”.
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insofar as it is undergone has this ineffable immediacy; it cannot be regarded as 
something inherently cognitive or discursive or relational.
This had aspect is the basis for aesthetic or consummatory experience, for 
immediacy can be immediacy of meaning, meaning as had34. Some experiences as 
had are simply mute, like stubbing one’s toe in the dark. But others that are outcomes 
of processes in which intelligence has been at work can embody the meaning of the 
history in its had, undergone, or immediate aspect. Here, a given moment of listening 
to music carries with it the sense of the composition that has been already played; the 
musical phrase has poignancy, longing, searching, or joyful resolution as part of its 
felt quality. The present phrase develops and anticipates. This is as true of intellectual 
or practical activities as of those that are explicitly artistic. Dewey’s point is that 
the aesthetic “having” of meaning is not also an instance of knowing. The mistake 
of Platonic and Aristotelian metaphysics, according to Dewey, was that it took the 
aesthetic having of meanings and mistook them for objects of intuition or rational 
insight, i.e., as moments of knowing. Be that as it may, Dewey’s point is that the 
noncognitive is one of the features of transactional existence or nature. Thus, any 
attempt to “improve” Deweyan pragmatism by reafirming that all experience is 
cognitive would not be an improvement; it would be to invert it completely and turn 
it into precisely the sort of thing Dewey repudiated from the start. It would be an 
instance of the “Intellectualist Fallacy”. 
The noncognitive also functions in inquiry or cognitive experience. The idea of the 
ineffable not only constitutes a central feature of Dewey’s naturalistic metaphysics but 
contributes to a more sensitive analysis of all inquiry – all experiences of knowing – 
as underpinned and fundamentally guided by noncogntive dimensions of experience, 
by the “pervasive qualitative whole” or “qualitative thought”, as he came to refer 
to it. This is best set forth in an essay of 1930, “Qualitative Thought”. Our world of 
our existence, Dewey says, “is preeminently a qualitative world” in which “thought 
is deinitely regulated by qualitative considerations” (LW 5: 142). “The qualitative 
dimension of any experience is due to its being in a situation; whatever the internal 
complexity, a situation is dominated and characterized throughout by a single quality” 
(LW 5: 246). This is not some categorized or labeled quality, but one that is unique. The 
“selective determination and relation of objects in thought is controlled by reference 
to a situation – to that which is constituted by a pervasive and internally integrating 
quality, so that failure to acknowledge the situation leaves, in the end, the logical force 
of objects and their relations inexplicable” (LW 5: 246). It was Bertrand Russell’s 
failure to understand this that made him misunderstand Dewey’s Logic: The Theory 
of Inquiry, as Dewey notes in his response to Russell. Dewey’s comments provide 
a handy and pertinent reply to persistent misunderstandings by others as well35. 
34. This topic is the central theme of my John Dewey’s Theory of Art, Experience and Nature: The 
Horizons of Feeling (1987). The idea is preigured in James’s doctrine of the feeling of relations in 
The Principles of Psychology: “We ought to say a feeling of and, a feeling of if, a feeling of but, and a 
feeling of by, quite as readily as we say a feeling of blue or a feeling of cold” James (1890 I: 245-46). 
It subsequently developed into James’s radical empiricism.
35. See Schilpp (1951: 544-49).
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The situation is that ultimately to which thought refers, though the situation “as such 
is not and cannot be stated or made explicit” (LW 5: 147). It nevertheless constitutes 
“the universe of discourse” within which language can make sense and it “controls the 
terms of thought ” (LW 5: 247). In other words, for Dewey’s theory of experience, the 
noncognitive, qualitative dimension is present in the cognitive and ultimately guides 
it even in our most logical moments. 
The noncogntive is thus the basis of Dewey’s instrumentalism and forms a key 
dimension of his metaphysics of nature and underlies his theory of logic. This is not 
a vague or undeveloped aspect of an otherwise rugged scientiic naturalism; it is the 
core of Dewey’s conception of experience. One may disagree with it, but one should 
not try to appropriate it and “improve” upon it by forcing it to be the very theory it 
rejects. Dewey’s view, while certainly controversial, must stand in stark contrast to 
any form of “pragmatism” that believes that cognition is ubiquitous, that any belief 
can be translated into an action and that into explicit proposition. It rejects in principle 
the idea of an evolving rational whole of beliefs that is the whole story. If one is going 
to adopt linguistic pragmatism, it will be at the cost of all that is contained in Dewey’s 
concept of experience. And with that goes, I believe, most of what makes us human. 
Experience is Culture
As I have noted, one of the persistent causes of critical misinterpretation of Dewey 
is the understanding of his use of “experience” as if he were writing in the British 
empiricist tradition, i.e., of it being understood as “perception” or “idea” or “mental 
state” and so on, i.e., something “in” a “mind”36. Dewey is quite explicit that he never 
held this view, and he certainly did not in his “pragmatist” period. “The Postulate of 
Immediate Empiricism” opened the door to understanding experience as a situated 
event, as a way of existence that is primarily concerned with the relationships of 
human beings to the environment, inhabiting nature as social, communicating beings. 
In other words, “experience” in Dewey’s work is synonymous with “culture” as the 
term is used in anthropology: the structured practices and symbol systems by which 
human beings exist together as communities in the world and not as remote, individual 
mentalistic observers of sensations or holders of propositions. In a document meant to 
accompany a course taught in 1922, Syllabus: Types of Philosophic Thought, Dewey 
begins,
The word “experience” is here taken non-technically. Its nearest equivalents are such 
words as “life”, “history”, “culture” (in its anthropological use). It does not mean 
processes and modes of experiencing apart from what is experienced and lived. The 
philosophical value of the term is to provide a way of referring to the unity or totality 
36. This way of thinking derives ultimately from Descartes who presents the novel doctrine that ideas 
are “modes” of the substance res cogitans just as bodies are “modes” of the substance res extensa. 
Locke (somewhat inconsistently) adopts this manner of speech, emphasizing that the “idea” is now no 
longer the form of an object – its “objective” or substantial structure – but a “representation” of it, a 
modiication or mode of the mind, something that “the mind” observes directly or “mentally”, as part 
of its own subjective status. See Essay Concerning Human Understanding (II.viii.8 and IV.i.1).
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between what is experienced and the way it is experienced, a totality which is broken up 
and referred to only in ready-made distinctions or by such words as “world”, “things”, 
“objects” on the one hand and “mind”, “subject”, “person”, “consciousness” on the 
other. Similarly “history” denotes both events and our record or interpretation of them; 
while “events” include not only the acts and sufferings of human beings but all the 
cosmic and institutional conditions and forces which in any way whatsoever enter into 
and affect these human beings – in short, the wide universe as manifesting itself in the 
careers and fortunes of human beings. (MW 13: 351)
Dewey had been entirely clear about this in both versions of the irst Chapter 
of Experience and Nature37. Noting that the meaning of “experience” has two 
incompatible sources (the scientiic empirical method and “introspective psychology”) 
and rejecting the latter, the 1925 version begins with “coarse and vital experience” 
that is “a thing of moods and tenses” (LW 1: 367). This is what the artist as well as 
technician engages, whereas the philosopher only too often “substitutes a dialectical 
development of some notion of experience for an analysis of experience as it is 
humanly lived” (W 1: 367). Dewey adds, “we mean then by experience something at 
least as wide and deep and full as all history on this earth” (LW 1: 370). It is “the whole 
wide universe of fact and dream, of event, act, fancy and meanings, valid or invalid” 
(LW 1: 371). In the 1929 version, experience is synonymous with “its congeners, life 
and history” so that “it includes what men do, and also how men act and are acted 
upon, the ways in which they do and suffer, desire and enjoy, see, believe, imagine – 
in short processes of experiencing” (LW 1: 18). Both Chapters introduce what Dewey 
calls “the denotative-empirical method”, which is something that philosophers in 
particular should practice – the tracing back to primary, lived, existential situations 
in the world of the developed abstractions with which philosophy must deal. It is a 
way of avoiding the temptation to commit the Intellectualist Fallacy. It includes an 
awareness of cultural history, as Dewey’s running analyses of ancient and modern 
philosophy in the book well illustrate. This view of experience also accounts for the 
frequent references to the work of anthropologists in the book, not least of whom was 
Dewey’s famous colleague at Columbia, Franz Boas.
In his advanced old age, however, Dewey worked at drafts for a new introduction 
to Experience and Nature, one that would emphasize the role of cultural history 
even more. But he also entertained the thought of dropping the word “experience” 
altogether. “Were I to write (or rewrite) Experience and Nature today I would entitle 
the book Culture and Nature [...]. I would abandon the term ‘experience’ because of 
my growing realization that the historical obstacles which prevented understanding 
of my use of ‘experience’ are, for all practical purposes, insurmountable. I would 
substitute the term ‘culture’ because with meanings as now irmly established it can 
fully and freely carry my philosophy of experience” (LW 1: 361). Dewey underscores 
that he means “culture” in its full anthropological sense and not “its Matthew Arnold 
sense” (LW 1: 362).
37. For a discussion of these two versions – and why the second was so much more misleading than 
the irst – see my essay “Dewey’s Denotative-Empirical Method: A Thread through the Labyrinth” in 
The Human Eros (2013).
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Attention should be drawn here also to a signiicant essay published two years 
after Experience and Nature, “Philosophy and Civilization”, an essay that also gave its 
name to a collection of Dewey’s choice articles that appeared in 1931. Dewey argues 
that the relationship of philosophy to culture is “intrinsic”; this includes contemporary 
philosophy which operates under the illusion that it is “emancipated from the 
inluence of that complex of institutions which forms culture” (LW 3: 3). Philosophy 
does not just “happen” to have a history. “Meaning is wider in scope as well as more 
precious in value than is truth, and philosophy is occupied with meaning rather than 
with truth”, Dewey says (LW 3: 4). Truth is important, but it cannot claim the whole 
ield of meaning any more than cognitive experience could be taken to characterize 
all experience. Indeed, “truths are but one class of meanings” and beyond them there 
“lies the ocean of meanings to which truth and falsity are irrelevant” (LW 3: 4-5). 
“In philosophy”, adds Dewey, “we are dealing with something comparable to the 
meaning of Athenian civilization or of a drama or a lyric” (LW 3: 5). Human existence 
is mainly lived in the world of meaning, of imagination. “Imagination” here is not 
the individual power of fantasy but the cultural world of symbol and history. It is 
what gives deinition to the idea of living not merely biologically but as member of a 
culture in a moment of its history, something that may shape not only what one thinks 
and believes but how one engages such physical basics as sexuality. If philosophy is to 
have an intelligent role in cultural direction and even transformation, it must not only 
be aware of history but understand itself as historical in terms of culture, not just “the 
history of ideas”38. Human existence is historical and cultural; this is the lifeworld 
from which philosophy springs and it does not escape those conditions. The question 
is whether a philosopher acknowledges or represses this ground.
Thus any discussion regarding the use of “experience” in connection with 
“pragmatism” needs to face the fact that we are not talking about objects conjured 
up by philosophical abstractions, be they mental states or propositional attitudes; we 
are talking about the ways in which groups of human beings inhabit the earth through 
a shared symbolic life. The problems of reference would have to be translated into 
issues such as how an atl-atl or spear-thrower “refers” to bison, how a canoe “refers” 
to water or how a plough “refers” to wheat. The philosopher should be thinking less 
about speaking a language even more removed from primary experience and more 
about how well his or her thinking has remembered that primary world of embodied 
cultural existence. The hope would be that the Deweyan philosopher would endeavor 
to be somewhat literate in some of the world’s cultures, especially preindustrial and 
archaic cultures, and see that as more important than thinking about computers and 
neurology.
Thus, one of the major issues that divides “us” (experiential pragmatists or cultural 
naturalists) from “them” (linguistic pragmatists) is that “they” think we are holding 
38. It was some ifty years ago that Herbert Marcuse critiqued Anglophone philosophy in terms of its 
replication of patterns of industrial capitalism (especially as “pure research” by productive individuals 
leading to an aggregate of “knowledge” as commodifed “wealth”). But of course, refusing to see 
philosophy historically or culturally, Anglophone philosophers could not see how they replicated in praxis 
the theoretical commitments of the culture of capitalism. See One Dimensional Man (1964: Chapter 7).
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on to some archaic piece of epistemology when we have dropped epistemology 
altogether and the “intellectualist” view of experience that comes with it and embraced 
instead an existentially embedded view of cultural existence that turns toward life, the 
lived body, culture and history. With this comes a different form of philosophical 
praxis than that esteemed by the Anglophone tradition. All debates will be pointless 
misunderstandings until this is recognized. By “experience” we mean how people live 
in the world, how they inhabit nature together.
Language as the “Tool of Tools”
Brandom believes that one of the things that separates “us” (the linguistic 
pragmatists) from “them” (the experiential pragmatists) is that classical pragmatists 
“do not share the distinctively twentieth-century philosophical concern with language” 
(PP: 55). I suppose one other way of looking at it is that classical pragmatism had 
other concerns in addition to that and had not come to the narrow thought that 
all problems in philosophy were linguistic ones or that philosophy itself might be 
a product of the misuse of language. But Brandom picks on a very central idea of 
Dewey’s, that language is “the tool of tools”, and so thoroughly inverts its meaning 
that it indicates, I believe, just how deep the difference goes between “them” and “us”. 
Brandom does not like thinking of language as “the tool of tools” because, he says, it 
is a too narrow, a too utilitarian a view of language, as if language had “a purpose” or 
set of purposes like a Swiss Army knife39. This view would make Dewey’s theory of 
language an extension of way Locke characterizes language in Book III of his Essay: 
men invent language with full reasoning powers beforehand and the social ability to 
make agreements on what terms should stand for. Brandom is right that we don’t stand 
outside language like that – and Dewey more than agrees. While Brandom sees the 
“language as tool” metaphor linking pragmatism with the later Wittgenstein and the 
early Heidegger, he rejects the idea that it is a “mere tool”, something purely external, 
a device with a set of speciic conscious purposes behind it. 
In a spirit of generosity, Brandom tries to ind some positive things to say of 
Dewey’s view of language: (a) it acknowledges all the different kinds of “tools” 
language may have and their many purposes; (b) tools often “refer” to each other 
so that using one means using the others; (c) this view introduces a “normative” 
dimension insofar as a tool is supposed to perform a task; (d) tools are “more or less 
successful” and so there is a sliding scale of performance; and (e) a tool may perform 
well in some areas and less so in others, so it has a “muiltidimensional” aspect. “What 
I object to is the idea that language as a whole is to be understood in terms of its being 
39. Brandom completely misunderstands instrumentalism, describing it as the satisfaction of subjective 
desire in which the means is regarded as derivative and external. See (PP: 72-77). This is a complete 
inversion of Dewey’s analysis of the means-end relation and in fact is precisely the view he argued 
against: “many critics take an ‘instrumental’ theory of knowledge to signify that value of knowing is 
instrumental to the knower [...]. But ‘instrumentalism’ is not about personal disposition and satisfaction 
in knowing, but about the proper objects of science, what is ‘proper’ being deined in terms of physics” 
(LW 1:121). See also Dewey’s critique of utilitarianism in Human Nature and Conduct (MW  14: 133-
227).
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for something, in terms of its point being to serve as a means for the pursuit of ends” 
(PP: 79-80). Language doesn’t help us pursue our goals, insists Brandom, it makes 
those goals possible – so this sort of “pragmatism” “gets the essence of the linguistic 
precisely backwards” (PP: 80). Of course what has been gotten backwards is how 
pragmatists think of the means-end relation, Brandom confusing it with the dualistic, 
utilitarian view pervasively critiqued in the works of Peirce, James, and especially 
Dewey40. And what has been missed altogether is what Dewey does mean by the “tool 
of tools” characterization of language.
Since this is the key point whereby Brandom thinks a call for a “linguistic 
pragmatism” is warranted, I want to examine Dewey’s “tool of tool” metaphor, 
especially since I do not think it is hard to understand – providing one has read 
at least Chapters 4 and 5 of Experience and Nature. Dewey presents his discussion 
of communication – a more inclusive term than “language” – in the ifth Chapter 
of Experience and Nature. It has been preceded by Dewey’s description of the 
“denotative-empirical method” (Chapter 1) mentioned above, his view of existence 
as a rhythmic process of the stable and precarious (Chapter 2), the radical “had” or 
qualitatively immediate, actualized, undergone aspect of existence (Chapter 3) and 
the active, projective, engagement with the world in terms of possibility through 
mediation by “tools” (Chapter 4). By “tool” Dewey means anything that transcends 
immediacy whereby human beings engage the world in terms of possibility and not 
realized initude. It is not about an antecedently given subjective desire. A tool “is 
intrinsically relational, anticipatory, predictive. Without reference to the absent, or 
‘transcendence’, nothing is a tool” (LW 1: 146). Thus a tool is anything that exists 
in the present but is used as a relation to something that is not present. It orients our 
existence toward possibility and that is what action is. This is true of symbols, language, 
concepts as it is for “tools” in the more physical sense, hammers, atl-atls, bows, or 
canoes. It is by means of this orientation toward possibility that human experience 
begins to take on meaning through relations so the contours of nature begin to show 
themselves. This is the birth of imagination as well as of intelligence. Tools indicate 
possibilities in the present so that those possibilities can be operative meanings in the 
present. Through making possibilities immanent, values can present themselves and 
choices be made. A door may be physically present and so abstractly be a possibility 
of leaving a room. But if it is not known to be present – if it is hidden in some way – 
that possibility is not operative as a meaning in the present. The primary problem of 
intelligence is making possibilities present. Imaginative intelligence, in other words, 
enlarges the present situation to include some of its possibilities as meanings. This is 
the theme of the fourth Chapter of Experience and Nature.
In Chapter 5, “Nature, Communication, and Meaning”, Dewey is ready to discuss 
the transformation of human existence that came with symbolic behavior, constituting 
a new “plateau” of natural existence, as he describes it later on41. Citing Franz Boas, 
40. Dewey explicitly critiques the view of means that Brandom attributes to him at (LW 1: 134).
41. See Chapter 7, where Dewey presents the emergentist aspect of his metaphysics; nature is 
creative process for Dewey and so if nature produces living beings when before there were none or 
communicating beings where before there were none, he simply acknowledges that this indicates some 
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Dewey comments that anthropologists list using tools and having language as two key 
features of human behavior. He goes on: 
“Utensils” were discussed in the last Chapter, in connection with the useful arts and 
knowledge, and their indispensable relation with science pointed out. But at every point 
appliances and application, utensil and uses, are bound up with directions, suggestions, 
and records made possible by speech; what has been said about the role of tools is 
subject to condition by language, the tool of tools. (LW 1: 134)
This is the passage that makes Brandom infer that Dewey is thinking of language 
in the same way one might think of a hammer – something designed with a speciic 
purpose in mind whereby it can be evaluated as “doing its job” well or ill. The 
opposite is the case. What Dewey is saying is that language is the condition of tool-
using behavior in the more mundane sense. Language is the “tool” – the condition 
of the possibility – of other more speciic tools being made or used at all. It is not 
“one big tool” like all the little tools. Without language (primarily understood as 
communication) no other “tools” could come about. In other words, Dewey is once 
again pointing to culture. Nor is it just that having a “means” of communicating allows 
us to use other things as tools, as Locke thought. It transforms the kind of being we 
are; it allows us to participate in a shared life of meaning and value; it is the basis for 
our having a sense of self and sense of other. Dewey makes this explicit, repeating the 
very phrase: 
As to be a tool, or to be used as a means for consequences, is to have and to endow with 
meaning, language, being the tool of tools, is the cherishing mother of all signiicance. 
For other instrumentalities and agencies, the things usually thought of as appliances, 
agencies, and furnishings can originate and develop only is social groups made possible 
by language. (LW 1:146)
So, given that Dewey is not thinking of language as something “external” whereby 
we manipulate things, we should look closely at how he describes “communication”. 
Dewey tells a humble story of A making a request of B to bring her a lower. Dewey 
is sensitive to the social and behavioral requirements for anything to be interpreted 
as “pointing”. What is needed is that B must see himself from A’s point of view, both 
in relation to the lower and to him. He “responds to the thing from the standpoint of 
A” (LW 1:141). He cannot just see the lower ego-centrically but as it may function – 
and as he may function – in A’s experience. He must see the situation in terms of its 
relations of possibilities and imagine which of those are at play. The same is true of 
A’s attitude toward B; she must see herself from B’s point of view if she is to indicate 
desire for the lower. “Something is literally made common in two centres of behavior. 
of the things nature can do. Nature is what it does – what it has done and what it may do. Possibilities 
are part of nature. Thus Dewey has no need, as I see it, of what Brandom designates as the “leverage 
question” – how language comes to be. For Dewey that is a scientiic question. But in any case, we do 
not “leverage” ourselves out of nature. See (PP, 28 f.). Brandom betrays a constant attitude that reason 
is somehow apart from nature in his appeals to Kant, “the mother of us all”, as he likes to think.
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To understand is to anticipate together” (LW 1:141)42. More technically, A, in making 
the request, must put herself in B’s position and use that as a way of interpreting 
what gesture she should make – interpreting her own gesture from the standpoint of 
the other. This is a sort of imaginative experimentation to try to predict how another 
might interpret our own actions; it is crucial in determining how we understand our 
own meaning. So, too, B uses his perspective of himself from A’s position as a way 
of determining the meaning of the actions he will perform. This is what is involved: 
a mutual imaginative understanding of the situation from the standpoint of the other 
to come to a meaningful form of conduct for oneself; one realizes one is in a social 
communicative situation because of the mutual meaning of the symbols or gestures. 
There is, as it were, shared imaginative space43. Though Dewey does not mention it, 
one could add to this account the fact that each member, A and B, will be aware of the 
other being aware of the situation; there is recognition of what I have called “mutual 
alterity”44. In other words, a genuine “we” emerges, and so, therefore, an “I” and 
“Thou” can emerge as well45. 
Dewey is also clear that “language” is not a “thing” like a formal system – not even 
a thing that can be divided neatly into syntactics, semantics and pragmatics. Parts of 
it may be so analyzable: these may be functional distinctions of use in inquiry into 
language. But the irst and foremost aspect of language is that it involves hearers as 
well as speakers. I ind it more than curious that our century of linguistic philosophy 
has produced very little on the subject of listening. And listening of course involves 
attentiveness, acknowledgement of an other, emotional resonance, relective insight 
and an awareness of the unsaid, and perhaps of the unsayable. Thus the emphasis is 
upon communication as a process of mutual listening so that response is response to 
the listening: “The heart of language is not ‘expression’ of something antecedent, much 
less the expression of antecedent thought. It is communication; the establishment of 
cooperation in an activity in which there are partners, and in which the activity of each 
is modiied and regulated by partnership” (LW 1: 141)46.
On a inal note, language for Dewey is another way of saying “culture” along with 
“experience” and “mind”. Brandom even quotes a passage from Logic: The Theory of 
Inquiry that makes this explicit, without, as far as I can tell, realizing it. The passage 
Brandom quotes says, “Language in its widest sense – that is, including all means of 
communication, such as, for example, monuments, rituals, and formalized arts – is 
42. Here, too, Brandom actually quotes a passage from Dewey’s Logic: The Theory of Inquiry that 
briely discusses this aspect of communication, but as far as I can tell he makes nothing of it. See (PP: 
28-29). 
43. One might think of it as a game – the game of dialogue – which is the basis of other “language 
games”. I ind it a bit sad that when Wittgenstein came to think of language games his irst thought 
turned to someone giving orders and people following rules. I am unaware he ever gave attention to 
imagining oneself from another’s point of view.
44. See “Eros and Spirit”, in The Human Eros (2013: 409-13).
45. This theory of symbolic interaction was developed by both Dewey and his former colleague at 
Chicago, George Herbert Mead. Mead’s account, available as Mind, Self, and Society (1950), is more 
complex and nuanced than Dewey’s. This aspect of Mead’s theory was largely neglected by Charles 
Morris, his student and author of Signs, Language and Behavior (1946), which became so inluential 
in the Anglophone efforts to understand pragmatism. See (Chapter II: 5) for his discussion of Mead.
46. In the twentieth century only Buber, Gadamer, and Levinas really spoke to this issue besides Dewey.
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the medium in which culture exists and through which it is transmitted” (LW 12: 27-
28; see PP: 25). He quotes a similar passage a couple of pages later that repeats 
Dewey’s claim to be using “language” “in its widest sense” as “culture” (PP,  27; 
LW  14: 50). This is more than, as Brandom thinks, “instituting conceptual norms and 
applying them” (PP: 26). This is Dewey’s version of Dasein: our human existence 
is inherently cultural co-existence, living as an inheritor, inhabitant and transmitter 
of  living culture, to which Dewey also gives the name “mind” (LW 1:169 f.). In other 
words, education is a fundamental feature of human existence, a feature of our way 
of being-in-the-world. Here is where the “question of language” should begin47. We 
are inhabiting the world together; all of us will die, but culture will be passed along 
and the universe of meaning sustained. Education and learning are also involved with 
our basic human existence: it tells us something basic about what we are existentially, 
teachers and learners. Education is the cultural dialogue of death and life48.
Thus, insofar as the classical, experiential pragmatists are characterized (as 
Brandom portrays them) as giving too little attention to language, the opposite oddly 
turns out to be true. If “language” is taken to be the full symbolic mode of human 
existence, embracing culture, history, art, education and all the forms of nonverbal 
communication and care, it is “they”, not “we”, who have neglected the vast spectrum 
of human meaning to focus on rather narrow and in many cases highly artiicial 
topics. Even as far as the study of language goes, shouldn’t a linguistically oriented 
pragmatism have culturally diverse, anthropologically informed discussions of the 
topic, relying on such resources as Benjamin Lee Whorf’s famous discussion of the 
Hopi concept of time or Edward T. Hall’s analysis of the role of nonverbal forms of 
communication in different cultures?49 How can linguistic pragmatism make sense of 
music, meditation, dance, painting, ceremony, shared silence?50
Toward a Cultural Pragmatism
What would a cultural pragmatism (or ecological humanism) look like? I can 
briely indicate some ways in which I have tried to work out such an approach just to 
provide a contrast with the overly narrow agenda of “linguistic pragmatism”. It takes 
seriously Dewey’s complex idea of experience and his expanded view of the range of 
cultural meanings beyond verbal usage and rule-governed language games; in other 
words, it accepts seriously what the linguistic pragmatist would reject. In dealing with 
the problem of meaning it would try to understand it not in terms of propositional 
47. See Daniel N. Stern, The Interpersonal World of the Infant, (1985). See especially (“The Sense of 
the Verbal Self”, Chapter 8).
48. Dewey makes this point at the very beginning of Democracy and Education (MW: 9).
49. See Benjamin Lee Whorf, “An American Indian Model of the Universe”, in Language, Thought 
and Reality (1956), Edward T. Hall, The Silent Language (1973), and The Hidden Dimension (1969), 
and Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (1973), and Local Knowledge (1983).
50. See Junichiro Tanizaki’s brilliant monograph, In Praise of Shadows, trans. Thomas J. Harper and 
Edward G. Seidensticker (1977), for a study of the cultural signiicance of indeterminacy, mystery, the 
recessive (yin), and the void (sunyata) in classical Japanese culture.
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units and modes of inference, but in terms of the human need (or eros) for meaning 
and the ways that need is met in existence. 
It therefore begins with a thesis about human existence, which I call “the Human 
Eros”: human beings have a basic need to experience existence with meaning and 
value; otherwise we suffer and die51. This is an existential or ontological claim about 
human nature and can only be defended by asking what happens when meaning and 
value are drained from an individual’s life or the life of a group: What does it take 
to destroy a human life? – a different question that what it takes to kill someone – to 
rob the individual of any sense of meaning and value. Why do native peoples suffer 
as their cultures are engulfed by industrial “civilization”? This question of meaning 
is not about propositions and has everything to do with understanding life primarily 
from the relation of meaning to the welfare of human existence. Psychotherapist 
Viktor Frankl has left us a testimony of his irst-hand experience as a prisoner in a 
Nazi concentration camp and what happens to people when all sense of value and 
meaning is stripped away52. As a result, Frankl came to this conclusion, “Man’s search 
for meaning is the primary motivation in his life and not a ‘secondary rationalization’ 
of instinctual drives. This meaning is unique and speciic in that it must and can be 
fulilled by him alone; only then does it achieve a signiicance which will satisfy his 
own will to meaning”53. 
A second thesis accompanying that of the Human Eros is that our various cultures 
can be described as “spiritual ecologies”54. Human beings inhabit nature through 
culture and culture is what provides the environment of meaning to sustain the Human 
Eros. We do not exist merely as biological – much less as neurological – beings; we 
exist through culture. Different cultures have found different ways to weave a spiritual 
ecology of meaning and value around those who live within it. But each culture can 
be understood as one possible answer to the questions “What is the meaning of life? 
How shall we live?” One aim of cultural pragmatism is to examine these ecologies 
of meaning and the consequences that low from them, i.e., cultural praxeis55. By 
examining the worlds of human meaning and how they are embodied in cultural 
action there would be a larger sense of the possibilities of meaning through which 
we could critically relect on our own culture. Possibilities would be operative as 
immanently present. Cultural pragmatism would take up the critical question of how 
the Human Eros might best be served – what sort of world would it be in which 
human existence found its greatest fulillment? How should cultures seek to enrich the 
51. This is discussed in my book The Human Eros (2013). See especially the “Introduction” and the 
essays “The Human Eros” and “Eros and Spirit”.
52. See Viktor Frankl, Man’s Search for Meaning (1984).
53. Frankl (1984: 105). Frankl leaves the matter at the level of individual response – he was a 
psychiatrist treating individuals after all – and does not take it to the level of general culture as I do.
54. The term “spiritual” may be disturbing to hardnosed naturalists, but I use it not only to designate 
the “Geistlich” aspect of culture but that what values and beliefs are at the core of a culture are 
embodiments of what that culture thinks of as sacred, be they “supernatural” by the standards of 
contemporary science or not.
55. One of the key points that William James makes in the irst lecture in Pragmatism is that he is 
mainly interested in our beliefs not in terms of narrow “success” but as life-hypotheses – what is the 
meaning of my life as it is to be lived if I decide to believe this world hypothesis rather than that?
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possibilities for meaningful existence? Perhaps those cultures are richest that provide 
the best resources for people to live meaningful lives. Perhaps this concern should be 
a primary aim of education.
Cultural pragmatism would explore various ways in which cultures establish 
worlds of meaning. As a brief example here I will focus on the idea of Mythos. 
(The term “myth” has been hopelessly lost to the overriding sense of “false story”.) 
By Mythos, I mean a core event, story, belief, or meaning that is central to the self-
identity of a person, group or cultural world. Mythoi are one of the primary ways in 
which we experience the meaning of ourselves, our cultures and the world56. Mythos 
is a pervasive phenomenon in human existence, fundamental to our human being. 
Mythos is a way of maintaining a sense the values and meanings sustaining our 
lives such that, if it were somehow removed, damaged, or destroyed it would either 
constitute a crisis of meaning for that person, group or culture. Thus a Mythos has to 
do with a sense of who one is, who we are (what it means to be a member of a group 
of culture) and what the world means. On a personal level, for example, we all have 
certain key stories that embody for us a sense of our self-identity, of who we are – 
ones which if lost to memory would change us fundamentally. This can range from 
stores about where we grew up and when, generally innocuous but important for us, to 
those about crisis events in our lives or deep traumas. The same is true of groups. This, 
after all, is why the study of history and how it is taught becomes so charged with the 
way it is told. It is more than odd for Native Americans to be told of the “discovery of 
America” or “how the West was won”. If one of these core stories is radically altered, 
eroded, or destroyed completely it has devastating impact upon the person or group 
that had constituted its identity, the sense of self and world, through it. 
Cultures, like persons, often repeat Mythoi in various ways as restorations and 
renewals of the meaning of self, group and world. From fairly mild celebrations, like 
the Fourth of July, to solemn and charged religious rituals, like Easter or the Pueblo 
corn dances, such ceremonies are enacted to reafirm those key ideas and values that 
make the members of a culture who they are. Thus, while Mythoi may be embodied in 
cultures or personal memories as stories, they may be also be embodied in nonverbal 
ways: dances, clothing, song, ritual and so on. These Mythoi, if lost, changed, or eroded, 
will change the meaning of what it is to be a member of that culture just as an episode 
of Alzheimer’s will erode the self of the meaning of one’s life. Sometimes it may mean 
that a better meaning has replaced or transformed a worse. Progressive Muslims wish 
to have the meaning of the word jihad, “struggle”, to mean primarily the struggle to 
achieve justice and peace in the world and in oneself. American culture has core values 
in the idea of individualism and freedom and numerous Mythoi cluster about each of 
56. A more technical deinition is: “Mythos is a symbolic structure that provides a key element in 
creating and preserving a sense of self and world, the meanings that deine existence. Cultures have 
Mythoi, but so do groups within a culture and particular individuals. A Mythos is not a ‘myth’ (a false 
story) but an important story or symbolic structure. It conveys a fundamental sense of existential truth, 
truth in the sense in which a personal story about one’s past is regarded as ‘existentially true’ and not 
just as factually true. Tribal myths and rituals are archaic forms of mythoi – there is something of the 
sacred in their presence. The structure may be narrative but need not be. The structure of a temple may 
also be a Mythos. Philosophical systems are Mythoi” (Alexander 2013: 421).
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these tropes. The close interweaving of these tropes has led to the impasse on dealing 
rationally with gun laws. The point is that meeting the human need for inhabiting a world 
of meaning is one of the aims of culture, and culture involves recurrent embodiments of 
core meanings and values, especially as embodied in Mythoi, as renewed afirmations 
of the meaning of self, group and world. Thus part of a cultural pragmatism would be 
a study of various key Mythoi in cultures and how those Mythoi are embodied and 
perpetuated, modiied or effaced. Perhaps the study of our Mythoi might make us more 
critically aware of the tensions and conlicts at the core of our culture.
One inal example of a theme in cultural pragmatism is that of tropes. By “trope” 
I mean a core idea or value that constitutes the world of a culture57. In classical Greek 
culture the idea of virtue or excellence, aretē, was a trope that was thematized in a 
wide variety of ways, from the poems of Homer to images on temples to the Olympic 
games to the dialogues of Plato. Thus a trope may ind embodiment in media other 
than stories (such as gymnasia or athletic games) but be symbolically communicative 
nonetheless. Indeed a statue of an athlete may tell more in an instant about Greek 
culture than anything else. A trope of American culture is freedom. We embody this 
trope in countless ways, from movies to advertising to foreign policy. 
Cultures have a plurality of core tropes that can exist in supportive or tensive 
relation to each other. For example, the American trope of freedom is related to 
that of individuality. In some ways these support each other, but there are types of 
individual behavior that can come into conlict with the ideal of freedom. One of 
the functions of cultural creation is to try to clarify and resolve these conlicts and 
tensions. Greek culture extolled the ideal of excellence and that striving for it is good; 
but against this it set the sin of hubris or excess which destroys aretē. Thus many 
Greek stories involve the “tragic hero” who achieves greatness and then is destroyed 
through not knowing his proper limit. This is the undercurrent of that core text of 
Greek culture, The Iliad: Achilles has been greatly insulted, but his anger is excessive 
and the result is that his best friend is killed, which drives him to further excess. 
In his excess, Achilles’ heroic status is threatened. That is moderation, self-control, 
knowing oneself are essential to the pursuit of excellence. The story ends when at 
last he can recall himself to the limits of human mortality and surrender the body of 
Hector to Priam. Similar tensions between tropes are found in literature, religion and 
philosophy around the world. The Book of Job deals with a profound tension between 
core tropes of Judaism, the goodness of God and His power. The Bhagavad Gita seeks 
to reconcile the performance of duty (dharma) with devotional yoga. The Summa 
Theologiae seeks to harmonize faith and reason.
Such at least is one way that a philosophy based on Dewey’s cultural naturalism – 
“cultural pragmatism” if we must – can develop in a new direction without succumbing 
to the narrowness of Anglophone philosophy or to the conversational relativism that 
Rorty exhibited. It can aim at being intelligent, culturally literate, and willing to talk 
57. Speciically, a trope is “An archetypal core meaning or value that a culture uses to understand itself 
and which, therefore, needs exempliication. A trope avails itself of any number of types or various 
intermediary forms that become recurrent cultural themes at a certain generic level; e.g., the Cowboy, 
the Rebel, the Patriot, etc. may all be types relating to the trope of Freedom” (Alexander 2013: 420).
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beyond its own jargon if it is to do any good. It comes down to a conception of human 
existence, as I said at the beginning. I think the vision of our human being as epistemic 
knowing machines or rational moral agents is the anemic result of an empiricism 
without much experience.
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